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FROM CONDITION OF LIMITER LIABILITY TO
EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY: THE HISTORY OF
SHAREHOLDER AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY FOR
UNPAID WORKERS’ WAGES IN CANADA
Eric Tucker*

I. LABOR LAW’S RECURRING DILEMMA
The essence of the contract of employment is the performance of service
in exchange for wages. As such, labour assumes a commodity form--a
capacity that is bought and sold in labour markets. But because labour
cannot be separated from its bearer, and is not produced for the market, it
has been widely recognized as a special or fictive commodity1 that has
been the subject of a distinct legal regime. Historically, that distinct
regime--which will simply be referred to here as employment law--has
served both disciplinary and protective functions. On the one hand, it
assists employers to extract from the worker the value of the labour they
have purchased, while on the other it protects workers against
unacceptable exploitation. While these functions are a constant, the scope
and techniques of legal discipline and protection vary over time and place,
as does the balance between them, depending on such factors as the
development of social relations of production, the balance of power
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council, Canada generously funded this project. Joshua Dougherty, Christopher
Donovan, Kevin MacDonald students at Osgoode Hall Law School, and Laurent
Gloerfelt, a student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, provided research assistance.
I have benefited from comments by the journal’s anonymous reviewers, as well as from
those of Professors Judy Fudge, Harry Glasbeek, and Paddy Ireland. Earlier versions of
the paper were presented at the Toronto History Legal History Group and ClevelandMarshall College of Law, where I wrote the first draft while visiting.
1

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 73. Also see
Jamie Peck, Workplace: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets (New York: Guilford
Press, 1996), ch. 2.
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between workers and employers, dominant ideologies, etc. In the
fulfillment of these functions, law has encountered a series of recurring
dilemmas that stem structurally from labour’s special commodity status
and socially and politically from conflicts between workers’ and
employers’ interests.
This paper is part of larger project, which aims to identify and trace these
recurring dilemmas in the history of Canadian employment law. Here the
focus is on the history of a single strand of the wage protection function-shareholder and director liability for workers’ wages. The recurring
demand for wage protection arises from the near universal practice of
paying workers in arrears--that is, after they have provided service. As a
result, workers become their employers’ creditors and bear some risk that
they will not be paid. It is clearly unacceptable, however, for workers not
to be remunerated for the service they provided: non-payment of wages is
a breach of employers’ most fundamental contractual obligation to
workers and a cause of hardship to workers and their dependent family
members who rely on wages to meet their basic needs without the cushion
of significant savings or accumulations of property. As a result, when
workers’ wages are unpaid, not only are they deeply aggrieved, but also
the fictive nature of their commodity status becomes glaringly obvious and
there is widespread recognition that an injustice has occurred. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the protection of workers’ wages has deep roots
in the history of employment law, dating back to the Statute of Artificers.2
Wage protection has taken numerous forms, including: special procedures
for bringing actions to recover wages; some preference in bankruptcy
proceedings; liens on property whose value has been increased by the
performance of labour; contractor liability for sub-contractors; and
2

5 Eliz. c. 4 (1562). For a discussion of the background to the statute, see Donald
Woodward, “The Background to the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour Policy,
1558-63,” Economic History Review, New Series, 33 (1980): 32-44. On the operation of
the act and its use for wage recovery, see Douglas Hay, “England 1562-1875: The Law
and Its Uses,” in Paul Craven and Douglas Hay, eds., Masters, Servants, and Magistrates
in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2004), 59-116. The earlier Ordinance of Laborers (1349) 23 Edw. III and Statute of
Laborers (1351) 25 Edw. III, stat. 2, made no provision for wage recovery. See Robert C.
Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348-1381 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1993), 14-23.
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shareholder or director liability for wages owed by the corporation to
employees.3 Regardless of the legal form and technique, the protection of
workers’ wages runs up against other norms deeply embedded in the legal
regime, norms that constitute the legal infrastructure of capitalism, or what
will be called here capitalist legality. Thus one manifestation of the
recurring dilemmas of labour law is in the negotiation of the conflict
between the demand for wage protection and competing norms of
capitalist legality.
The history of shareholder and director liability for workers’ wages is a
particularly useful place to begin exploring the theme of recurring
dilemmas because it engages with the construction of a central feature of
modern corporate law and capitalist legality--the limited liability of
shareholders and directors for the debts of the business corporation.4
Indeed, as this article demonstrates, the two are closely intertwined: in
parts of Canada and the United States the demand for wage protection did
not arise to confront a pre-existing corporate law, but was present in the
process of its creation, needing to be accommodated in the first general
incorporation statutes. Numerous Canadian and American legislatures
responded to this demand by making shareholder and later director
liability for unpaid workers’ wages a condition of granting widespread
access to the privilege of forming limited liability corporations. Yet
within a short time, judicial decision-making inverted this understanding
of the conditionality of limited liability and instead reconstructed limited
liability as a basic norm of capitalist legality rather than as an exceptional
privilege. In so doing, the courts also transformed the protection of
workers’ wages from a normative and legal condition of granting
3

For an early survey of Canadian wage protection laws, see “Legislation in Canada with
Regard to Payment and Protection of Wages,” Labour Gazette (October, 1906), 377-87.
4

Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, “What is Corporate Law?” in Reiner
Kraakman et al., eds., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 1, 8-10. Their view that the widespread adoption of limited liability for
corporations is strong evidence of its value, is contested by recent works in economic
sociology that see the triumph of the modern corporation as a political accomplishment of
powerful actors. See Charles Perrow, Organizing America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002), esp. 207-09 and William G. Roy, Socializing Capital (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997).
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corporate investors and managers the privilege of limited liability into an
exceptional privilege granted by the state in derogation of the norm of
limited liability. Then, on the basis of this inversion, judges narrowly
interpreted the scope of director liability for unpaid workers’ wages both
in relation to who and what was protected. The judicial inversion,
however, was neither total nor did it completely resolve the tension
between the demand for wage protection and the claim of limited liability
once and for all. Some judges continued to give priority to wage
protection, legislation was enacted extending the personal scope of wage
protection laws to all employees, and proposals to abolish shareholder or
director liability for workers’ wages entirely have not been implemented,
even by conservative governments. The dilemma is indeed a recurring
one.
This paper is organized in the following way. The next section explores
the history of shareholder and director liability for workers’ wages and its
place in the enactment of the first general incorporation statutes in Canada.
It covers the period from 1800 to 1860. The third section examines a
series of cases in which the courts were called upon to determine which
workers were entitled to recover against shareholders or directors for
unpaid wages. In the course of resolving these cases, the courts inverted
wage protection from a condition of limited liability to an exceptional
privilege. This covers the period from the 1890 to 1970. In contrast to the
prior section, which offers a more deeply contextualized study, this section
primarily offers a doctrinal history, while locating that history broadly in
the changing social, economic and political background. Although
perhaps unfashionable, this approach is justified for two reasons. First, the
work of legally inverting personal liability from a foundational norm to an
anomalous exception and thereby limiting the scope of wage protection
laws was performed through the elaboration of doctrine by the judiciary
and is important in its own right. Second, for reasons that are suggested,
during this period disputes over the extent of director liability for workers’
wages were largely confined to the courtroom, and attracted little if any
public discussion, thus leaving the judiciary with a free hand. The fourth
section addresses the continuing effect of this inversion in a more recent
controversy that first arose in the 1980s over directors’ liability for
termination and severance pay, typically the greatest part of what is owed
to workers when corporations default. Here again the focus in on doctrinal
developments set against the broader socio-economic context. The
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conclusion discusses the implications of the judicial inversion both for
current debates over directors’ liability and for the recurring dilemma of
negotiating worker protection in regimes of capitalist legality.

II. THE ORIGINS OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND
SHAREHOLDER/DIRECTOR LIABILITY FOR
WORKERS’ WAGES
The notion that a group of investors should be able to pool their capital
into a legal entity that is distinct from them and only be individually liable
to the extent of their personal investment is so broadly accepted today that
those who challenge it face an uphill battle.5 But this was not always the
case. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century history of the corporation
shows that the idea of a complete separation between the company and its
members took a long while to gain acceptance and that the fight to limit
shareholders’ liability exclusively to their initial investment was a
protracted and difficult one. Incorporation and limited liability for
shareholders were, after all, privileges granted by the state, which
exempted individuals from the norm of personal responsibility for their
actions and debts, even when acting in concert with others.6 As such,
compelling public policy justifications had to be offered before the state
granted such extraordinary privileges to private individuals. In this
context, it also seemed eminently fair for the state to adopt measures
5

For a critique of limited shareholder liability, see Harry J. Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth:
Corporate Crime, Corporate Law and the Perversion of Democracy (Toronto: Between
the Lines, 2002). For arguments in favour of modest reforms, see Henry Hansmann and
Reiner Kraakman, “Towards Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts,” Yale Law Journal
100 (1991): 1879-1934 (supporting shareholder liability to involuntary creditors) and
Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law,” University of Toronto Law Journal 30 (1980):
117-50 at 149-50 (approving director liability for workers’ wages).
6

The legal basis of the limited liability of directors to third parties for the debts of the
corporation is distinct from that of shareholders, rooted in the law of agency. The article
will return to this issue below in the context of its discussion of the substitution of
director for shareholder liability in Canada in the 1860s.
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reducing the risks limited liability posed for various groups who dealt with
corporations.7 It was out of these early struggles that shareholder and then
director liability for unpaid workers’ wages emerged as a compromise that
legitimated the widespread availability of limited liability.

A. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN INFLUENCES
The story of the development of the corporate form, limited liability and
liability for workers’ wages in Canada begins in England, but shifts to the
United States by 1800. In England prior to the mid-to-late nineteenth
century, joint business endeavors were primarily pursed through
partnerships and joint stock companies. Neither of these business
associations enjoyed corporate status and, as a result, its members were
jointly and severally liable for its debts, including of course workers’
wages. Incorporation was a privilege that could only be obtained at great
expense by Royal Charter or special act of Parliament and was rarely
granted.8
British North American colonies essentially followed English practice in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. For the most part, this
meant that business associations generally carried on without becoming
incorporated and without the benefit of limited liability. Limited liability
7

For a useful overview, see David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation,” Duke Law
Journal [1990] (1990): 201-62 at 205-11. This paper does not address the mechanisms
for the protection of non-wage earning creditors. These have been extensively discussed
in the literature on the history of the corporation. For example, see James Willard Hurst,
The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780-1970
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970), 51-53.
8

Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); Paddy Ireland, “Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company
Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality,”
Legal History 17:1 (1996): 40-73 at 42-43; Michael Lobban, “Corporate Identity and
Limited Liability in France and England 1825-67,” Anglo-American Law Review 25
(1996): 397-440 at 399-403; Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 4-17.
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corporations were almost exclusively created to carry out public purposes,
such as the construction and operation of public utilities, including roads,
bridges, banks, water and gas, piers and railways. Professor Risk
estimated that in Upper Canada prior to 1841 approximately 60 businesses
were incorporated by special statute. Nearly all delegated public power to
private organizations for the construction and management of public
utilities. Similarly, in Nova Scotia the majority of the 54 corporations
created up to 1850 were for public utilities.9
In the United States a similar pattern prevailed in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries; nearly all incorporations were by special statute
for the purpose of providing public utilities.10 Public acceptance of
limited liability for companies providing public utilities, however, did not
easily extend to private business ventures. For example, the 1797 New
York act incorporating the Hamilton Manufacturing Society provided for
full shareholder liability and in 1809 the Massachusetts legislature adopted
the policy of making shareholders in all industrial corporations personally
liable to creditors. Full shareholder liability, however, was short-lived,
and within a few years most American states adopted a policy of double
liability. For example, New York’s general incorporation statute for
manufacturing of 1811 made shareholders liable for debts owing by the
corporation at the time of its dissolution to an amount equal to the value of

9

R.C.B. Risk, “The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in
Ontario,” University of Toronto Law Journal 23 (1973): 270-306, at 271-73. Barbara
A.M. Patton, “From State Action to Private Profit: The Emergence of the Business
Corporation in Nova Scotia, 1796-1883,” Nova Scotia Historical Review 16:1 (1996): 2160 at 32-33. Also, see F.E. Labrie and E.E. Palmer, “The Pre-Confederation History of
Corporations in Canada,” in Jacob Ziegel, ed., Studies in Canadian Company Law
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1967), 42-53 and A.W. Currie, “The First Dominion Companies
Act,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28 (1962): 387-404.
10

Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1917), 106, 317; Hurst, Legitimacy of the Business
Corporation, 27; Roy, Socializing Capital, 45-50.
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their initial investment (double liability), as did New Jersey in 1816.
Massachusetts, however, retained unlimited liability until 1830.11
The debate around limited liability was reignited and intensified in the
1820s and continued through the 1840s as part of a larger political debate
over the legitimacy of the corporation. Broadly speaking, opposition came
from two groups.12 The first, which included some Whigs and liberal
Democrats, was mostly concerned about the dangers of monopolization
and fraud. One fear was that charters would grant corporations exclusive
rights to engage in a business, and that private interests would corrupt the
legislative process so that only individuals with political sway could
obtain the benefits of incorporation and limited liability. Supporters of
limited liability met this concern by making incorporation more freely
available through the enactment of general incorporation statutes that
allowed any group of investors to incorporate by following simple
procedures.13 A second concern of this group was that corporations would
defraud creditors by misrepresenting the amount of capital actually
subscribed. This concern was addressed by legislative measures that held
shareholders personally liable for part of the corporate debt until their
shares were fully paid up and by creating greater transparency, for
example, by requiring corporate officers to publish annual reports
disclosing the corporation’s financial situation. With these protections in

11

Charles M. Haar, “Legislative Regulation of New York Industrial Corporations, 18001850,” New York History 22 (1941): 191-207 at 194-5; Edward Merrick Dodd, American
Business Corporations until 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1954), 370-71;
John W. Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics 1791-1875
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 344; Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and
American Law 1836-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 49-55. For one
of the earliest discussions of the issue, see Jsopeh K. Angell and Samuel Ames, A
Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little &
Wilkins, 1832, reproduced New York: Arno Press, 1972), 357-64.
12

13

Roy, Socializing Capital, 46.

L. Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 22245.
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place, corporations were viewed as a valuable instrument that facilitated
investment in riskier and more capital-intensive enterprises.14
The second group of opponents articulated a more radical critique of the
corporate form rooted in producer republicanism. This was an ideology
embraced by a farmers, small business operators and artisans who were
united in the defense of independent artisan and commodity production
against the growth of capitalist enterprise, characterized by the creation of
a permanent working class and concentrations of wealth and power. From
their perspective, corporations and limited shareholder liability served as a
vehicle which enabled privileged groups to gain unfair advantage over
ordinary individuals. As a result, making the corporate form and limited
liability more widely available and providing for greater financial
transparency were not adequate responses.15
In the contest between liberals and radicals, the former generally
prevailed. For example, in 1828 New York adopted complete limited
liability for shareholders once whole amount of the capital had been paid
in. Massachusetts followed suit in 1830, while in New Jersey the majority
of charters granted to manufacturing companies between 1824 and 1834
made no provision for shareholder liability.16
Agitation for greater creditor protection renewed in the early 1840s, as the
economy recovered from the economic panic of 1837 and the pace of
business incorporation increased. For example, in New York double
liability became the norm again in 1844.17 In 1846 a New York State
14

Hurst, Legitimacy, 33; Hovenkamp, Enterprise, 51; Cadman, Corporation, 345-56.

15

Tony A. Freyer, Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum
America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-14; Sean Wilentz, Chants
Democratic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
16

Haar, Legislative Regulation, 196; Hovenkamp, Enterprise, 51; Cadman, Corporation,
345.
17

New York State Senate, Report, No.143 (22 November 1847), 9. The double liability
provision became known as the Oriskany clause, named after the manufacturing
corporation whose charter renewal application set the new standard.
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senate committee examined the larger policy questions that had been
percolating just beneath the surface. The chair of the committee and
author of its report was Thomas Barlow, a lawyer and a judge of the court
of common pleas in Madison County, in central New York.18 Barlow
noted that popular opinion was growing against special incorporation and
“in favor of imposing such liability upon all stockholders, as shall render
the corporation safe as to the interests of creditors….”19 Barlow’s report
largely reflected the producerist position. First, it identified the danger
posed by the concentration of wealth: “The accumulation of wealth is a
concentration of power, in all practical affairs, and bears oppressively
against the interests of those of limited means, devoted to the same
business purposes, and such concentration should not be created by law,
unless some resulting benefits will be realized to the people, paramount to
the evil.”20
While the encouragement of manufacturing and industrial pursuits that
required concentrations of capital was a legitimate reason for granting the
privilege of corporate status, it did not justify limited liability. “Men
cannot be allowed to escape their obligations in this manner; for if they
could, an aristocracy of wealth and means would spring into existence at
once, bearing omnipotent sway to the ruin, beggary and slavery of
thousands of our industrious mechanics and laborers.”21 The report
recommended that charters be granted “stripped and naked of the favored
feature of exemption from just responsibility, and imposing individual
personal liability for all debts incurred; thus assimilating bodies corporate

18

On Barlow, see http://www.barlowgenealogy.com/Politics/index.html (5 March 2007).

19

New York State Senate Report of the committee on manufactures, on petitions for the
incorporation of manufacturing companies, No. 13 (19 January 1846), 1.
20

Ibid, 2.

21

Ibid, 3.
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to voluntary associations, justifiable and responsible in the ordinary
business affairs of men.”22
The issue of incorporation was considered at length during the 1846 New
York State constitutional convention. One reason for calling the
convention was widespread concern over the scope of government
involvement in the economy and many of its reforms aimed to curtail the
legislature’s power to distribute public largess to private interests.23
Consistent with that goal, the standing committee on corporations
proposed a constitutional provision prohibiting special incorporations but
permitting the enactment of general incorporation statutes. A modified
version of that resolution was accepted after lengthy debate.24 While there
was widespread support for general incorporation laws, the issue of
limited shareholder liability was more divisive. Initially the convention
voted to entrench unlimited proportional shareholder liability, but the issue
was re-opened and a majority of the convention delegates were convinced
that it was best to leave the matter to the legislature. As a result, the
constitution specified that “[d]ues from corporations shall be secured by

22

Ibid, 4.

23

Gunn, Decline of Authority, 170-97 and “Antebellum Society and Politics (1825-1860)
in Milton M. Klein, ed., The Empire State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001),
390-93; Peter J. Galie, Ordered Liberty: A Constitutional History of New York (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 95-116.
24

Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York, Vol. II (Rochester, NY:
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing, 1906), 184-95. According to A.B. Johnson, president
of a Utica bank and a strong supporter of free incorporation, the measure lifted the
“demoralizing effect of legislative attempts to restrain men unnecessarily from promoting
their own interests” by making incorporation readily accessible to all, thereby eliminating
the problem of monopoly and the corruption of the legislative process that was associated
with special charters. A.B. Johnson, “The Legislative History of Corporations in the
State of New York, or, The Progress of Liberal Sentiments,” Hunt’s Merchants Magazine
XXIII (December 1850) 610-14 in Carter Goodrich, ed., The Government and the
Economy, 1785-1861 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 396-405 at 401.
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such individual liability of the corporators, and other means prescribed by
law.”25
The subsequent 1846 election returned a Whig government, which was
given the task of implementing the new constitution. The Senate
committee on manufactures, still chaired by Thomas Barlow, was
mandated to consider the question of general incorporation and its March
1847 report reflected the producerist critique of the corporation. It began
by noting the ambiguity of the constitutional provision, neither imposing
full personal liability nor allowing for personal liability to be dispensed
with entirely, which, therefore, required a consideration of first principles.
While recognizing the great importance of manufacturing to “our
prosperity as a people” the report noted, “[l]abor and the fruits of
labor…constitute the grand capital of the people as a whole, and the only
sources of living and comfort to the individual constituents of the great
community.”26 The report then noted that most stockholders “are not
mechanics or manufacturers in fact; they merely invest their money to
profit by the labor and property of others. …It is difficult for your
committee to see upon what principles worthy of recognition, in an honest
business world, a class of men can come forward and ask the right of
employing laborers, and of purchasing and receiving the property of
others, without being required to stand liable and pay fully for the same.27
Following an exposition on the history of incorporation and limited
liability, the report turned its attention to the evils that would flow from
exonerating capitalists from liability to pay honest debts. “What class shall
be thus favored, in whole or in part? …Shall it be the farmer, the
merchant, the blacksmith, the day laborer, the lawyer, the doctor, the
25

New York State Constitution (1846), Art. 8, § 1-2; William G. Bishop and Willaim H.
Attree, eds., Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of
the Constitution of the State of New York (Albany, NY: Evening Atlas, 1846), 975-79,
1013, 1020-21; Lincoln, Constitutional History, 184-95.
26

New York State Senate, Report On so much of the Constitution as relates to
manufacturing corporations, No. 53 (4 March 1847), 3.
27

Ibid, 4.
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carpenter, the mechanic of any kind? No, not any one man, nor men in
common, but the capitalists, and those of all others best able to pay their
debts.”28 The report also rejected the view that limited liability was
justified because shareholders did not personally make the corporations’
contracts or incur its debts.
If they do not do it in person, they do by officers or
agents of their own choosing, for whose acts they are
justly responsible…If men are not to be held
responsible for the act for the acts of their agents,
then they may submit their business to others, receive
the benefits and avoid all risks…Large tears may be
dropt in their advocacy, but they roll from the eyes of
the hungry crocodile. In short, corporate rights are
hostile to the very spirit of our institutions, unjust and
oppressive to the rights of individuals.29
The Senate subsequently approved general incorporation legislation that
made shareholders personally liable for the general debts of the
corporation up to an amount equal to their initial investment (double
liability) and that made them personally liable without limit for debts
owed to workers providing service to the corporation.
The stockholders of any company organized under
the provisions of this act, shall be jointly and
severally individually liable for all debts that may be
due and owing to all their laborers, servants and
apprentices, for services performed for such
corporations.30

28

Ibid, 17.

29

Ibid, 20-1.

30

New York State Senate, Report, No. 143 (22 Nov. 1847), 17, 19.
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The Assembly accepted unlimited shareholder liability for unpaid wages,31
but rejected personal shareholder liability for other debts once the shares
were fully paid in.
Manufacturing interests and towns in western New York launched a
vigorous lobbying effort to support the Assembly’s position, arguing that
the promotion of manufacturing would bring prosperity to New York and
that the proposed law gave small investors the same access to the
advantages of incorporation that previously were only available to the
wealthy. The Albany Argus also emphasized that the law blended the
interests of capital and labour by securing “to the Operative the reward of
his labor under every conceivable contingency.”32 Opponents replied that
“it will probably be some time before the producing classes will submit to
be so grossly humbugged as to rally with any great zeal an ardor in favor
of the passage of a law to exempt corporate capitalists from the payment
of honest debts.”33 The Senate resisted the manufacturers’ lobbying34 and,
in the absence of an agreement with the Assembly, no general
incorporation statute passed.
The elections of 1848 returned another Whig-dominated state government.
In his opening address to the legislature, Governor Young called for the
enactment of general incorporation legislation modeled on the Assembly’s
bill. In his view, New York’s future prosperity lay with the development
of industry, “[b]ut that this object can only be obtained under laws that
will invite the investment of capital.” The governor, however, also noted
31

“The…principle that they shall be liable to the classes of creditors who from the nature
of the service they render are compelled to give credit until the service is performed, is
founded in justice and sound policy….” New York State Assembly, Report No. 240 (18
Nov. 1847), 6. Also see New York State Senate, Report No. 116 (29 September 1847).

32

Albany Argus, 9 October 1847, quoted in Gunn, Decline, 235.

33

Letter to the editor, E., “The Manufacturing Bill at Oswego” Albany Evening Atlas, 9
October 1847, 2.
34

New York State Senate, Report, No. 143 (22 November 1847), 6-9. Also see Albany
Evening Argus, 19 November 1847, 2 for an account of the Assembly debate.
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the Assembly’s “jealous regard for the interests of labor” manifested, inter
alia, in the wage liability provision.35 Later that term, the Assembly’s
version of the general incorporation act passed with little opposition. The
principle of full limited shareholder liability was embraced, except in the
case of workers’ wages.36

B. THE CANADIAN DEBATE
Republicanism did not hold the same sway in Canada as it did in the
United States. Nevertheless, strains of a producerist worldview resonated
in the discourse of political reformers in the early decades of the
nineteenth century. For example, William Lyon Mackenzie aimed to
advance the welfare of “the people” defined as “the honest yeoman,” “the
self-respecting honest mechanic,” and the “freeman of Upper Canada” in
opposition to the “parasites and sycophants.” As Mackenzie became more
radicalized in the 1830’s, influenced in part by American ideas, he
embraced a labour theory of value and attacked special privileges. Clause
56 of his draft Constitution for the State of Upper Canada provided:
“There shall never be created within this state any incorporated trading
companies, or incorporated companies with banking powers. Labour is
the only means of creating wealth.” The draft Constitution also declared
that “in all laws made, or to be made, every person shall be bound alike,
neither shall any…charter…confer any exemptions from the ordinary
35

Messages from the Governors of New York, Vol. 4, 400, Jan. 4 1848, cited in Ronald
E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 194. Albany Evening Atlas, 4 January 1848, 2. On the
background to the 1848 election and its results, see Charles W. McCurdy, The Anti-Rent
Era in New York Law and Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2001), 280-81.
36

An Act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining,
mechanical or chemical purposes, Laws of New York, 1847, Chap. 40. Editorial
comment divided along predictable lines. See “The General Manufacturing Bill,” Daily
Albany Argus (12 February 1848), p.2 (favorable) and “Individual Liability – Remarks of
Senator Hawley,” Albany Evening Argus, 11 February 1848, 2.

16

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 02

course of legal proceedings and responsibilities whereunto others are
subjected.” Thus corporations, and especially but not exclusively bank
corporations, were objectionable because they involved state conferral of
special privileges, including limited liability, on a select few who were not
direct producers of wealth.37
After the defeat of the 1837 rebellions, moderates emerged to lead the
reform movement and focused more narrowly on the achievement of
responsible government than on more radical social and economic
reforms. Yet, many moderate reformers remained opposed to the
extension of limited liability to private enterprise, a position that was
shared by some supporters of the weak conservative government in power
during the mid-1840s. As Professor Fecteau noted, opposition was rooted
in the ambiguous relationship between the corporate form, including the
combination of capital it facilitated and limited liability, and classical
liberal principles of free competition and personal responsibility and was
manifest in the debates and actions of the Legislative Assembly of the
Province of Canada during the 1840s.38
The decade began with enormous promise and rapid economic growth,
fuelled by demand for Canadian wheat and lumber, but ended with a
severe economic recession, leading Canadian businessmen and politicians
to seek strategies to promote renewed growth, including industrialization
37

Constitution for the State of Upper Canada, quoted in R.A.McKay, “The Political Ideas
of William Lyon Mackenzie,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 3
(1937): 1-22 at 19. Also, see Lillian F. Gates, “The Decided Policy of William Lyon
Mckenzie,” Canadian Historical Review 40 (1959): 185-208; Donald Creighton, The
Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), 278-80; Carol Wilton, Popular
Politics and Political Culture in Upper Canada, 1800-1850 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2000).
38

Jean-Marie Fecteau, “Les ‘petites républiques’: les compangnies et las mise en place du
droit corporatif moderne au Québec au milieu du 19e siécle,” Histoire Sociale – Social
History 49 (1992): 35-56 at 45-50. The Province of Canada was formed by united Upper
and Lower Canada, which became officially known as Canada West and Canada East.
After Confederation in 1867, the provinces assumed their present names of Ontario and
Quebec. To limit confusion, I use the designation of Upper and Lower Canada when
discussing events in the pre-Confederation period.
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and the construction of railways.39 The question of access to incorporation
and limited liability, however, remained controversial and the debate
crossed party lines and divided the business community. Its first iteration
arose in the context of special legislation in 1843 to incorporate a
company authorized to carry out fishing and mining activities in the Gaspé
region of Lower Canada. Thomas Aylwin, a lawyer from Lower Canada
and a reformer, raised the concern that the incorporation statute would
grant private British investors monopoly powers, thus enabling them to
“lord it over the whole district, and render the people subservient to its
views and interests,” while the Inspector General, Francis Hincks, a
moderate Reformer from Upper Canada, objected specifically to the
limited liability clause. Nevertheless, supporters, such as Thomas Merritt,
a reform sympathizer from Upper Canada, won the vote, arguing that in
the absence of limited liability corporations it would be impossible to raise
the capital necessary to develop the country’s resources.40
The issue resurfaced in 1845 during the course of lengthy debates over the
enactment of special legislation incorporating two limited liability cottonmanufacturing companies and a forwarding company in Lower Canada.
Proponents of the cotton-manufacturing bills, such as Lewis Thomas
Drummond, a Lower Canadian politician aligned with the reform
opposition, argued that limited liability was necessary to promote local
manufacturing that, among other benefits, would counter the problem of
young girls migrating to factory jobs in the United States and keep them
“within hearing the bell of their native villages, and within the reach of the
vigilance and protection of their parents,” while opponents, such as Robert
39

J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967),
104-09; A.A. Den Otter, The Philosophy of Railways (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997), 34-64; R.B. Sullivan, Lecture Delivered before the Mechanics’ Institute of
Hamilton on the Connection between the Agriculture and Manufactures of Canada
(Hamilton: Ruthven, 1848).
40

Debates of the Legislative Assembly of United Canada (8 November 1843), 725-29; S.
Prov. Can. 1843, c. 45, s. 19. There was also a debate about limited liability in bank
charters that focused on the risks to depositors. It was resolved by imposing double
liability on shareholders, initially at the insistence of the Colonial Office. See S. Prov.
Can. 1849, c. 84 (no wage liability) and A.B. Jamieson, Chartered Banking in Canada
(Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1957), 7.
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Baldwin, the leader of the reform opposition in Upper Canada,
emphasized the principle of individual responsibility and the need to
contain harmful speculation. Both bills passed.41 In the course of
considering the legislation for the forwarding company, witnesses from
the Montreal business community appeared before the assembly. While
James Dean, a director of the company, testified in favour of limited
liability, Thomas Cringan, the vice president of the Montreal Board of
Trade, expressed the view that “it [is] objectionable that any commercial
company should be incorporated without making them liable to the full
extent of their means” and John T. Brondergest, a merchant and former
president of the board of trade, felt that limited liability was necessary in
certain cases that directly benefit the public, such as banks and railways,
but should not be granted to enterprises conducted purely for commerce.42
The bill was withdrawn and a revised one re-introduced, which provided
for triple liability by stockholders and other securities, but this still did not
satisfy opponents and the bill failed to pass. Another attempt made the
following year met the same fate following an acrimonious debate.43
Given the level of opposition to granting private entrepreneurs limited
liability, a bill introduced that session to incorporate an Upper Canadian
manufacturing company was amended by adopting the Quebec civil law
partnership en commandite arrangement, which allowed for quiet investors
to be liable only to the extent of their investment, while leaving active
partners – the directors – personally liable for the debts of the partnership.

41

Debates (20 January 1845), 1005-11; (6 March 1845), 1950-55 (quote at 1954). S.
Prov. Can. 1845, c. 91 & 92. The bills were reserved by the Governor, E.G. Metcalfe, on
the ground that they were inconsistent with English policy not to grant corporate status to
enterprises that did not require substantial capital, but the Colonial Office took no action
on the ground that the resulting inconvenience would be too great, especially given that
the matter had been already considered locally. See Fecteau, “Les ‘petites républiques,”
52-53. More generally on debates over limited liability in Canada during this period, see
Risk, “Nineteenth-Century Foundations,” 295-98.
42

Debates (3 March 1845), 1856-58.

43

Debates (5 March 1845), 1940-41, (28 April 1846), 1016-18.
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Although some members remained opposed to this compromise
arrangement, the bill easily passed.44
In 1847 several bills were introduced to incorporate limited liability
mining companies, sparking yet another round of debate. Robert Baldwin,
endorsed “the old fashioned principle that men were bound in conscience,
and ought to be bound in law to pay all their debts,” but the majority of the
Tory-dominated assembly accepted the judgment of William Boulton, a
Toronto Tory lawyer and prominent Orangeman, that the denial of limited
liability to corporations “would discourage the investment of capital, in the
country…that it was an antideluvian (sic) doctrine altogether.”45 Still,
views on the issue crossed party lines. Later that session, for example, a
general partnerships bill for manufacturing companies that provided for
limited liability was withdrawn after the Upper Canadian government
leader, Henry Sherwood, a prominent Tory, objected, stating that while he
was in favour of “liberal legislation in matters of commerce” he was “not
in favour of extending liberality so far as to excuse persons from paying
their debts. This Bill went beyond liberality. It out heroded Herod.”46
The 1847-48 elections returned a Reform government, jointly led by
Baldwin and Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine from Lower Canada. The issue
of limited liability arose again in an 1849 debate over the incorporation of
a Lower Canadian warehousing company. Henry Sherwood reiterated his
objection to limited liability in the absence of compelling reasons for
granting it. He feared that if the assembly approved limited liability in this
case, it would soon become the norm for business. Robert Baldwin
44

Debates (14 May 1846), 1451-52. S. Prov. Can. 1846, c. 94, s. 14. One Upper
Canadian reform newspaper, The Examiner, opposed this compromise, in part based on a
misunderstanding of the extent of directors’ liability, but more fundamentally because of
their radical reform outlook which associated the rise of corporations with the creation of
a situation in which “labour becomes subservient to capital” and “the few are privileged
and the many wronged.” The Examiner, “The Personal Liability Principle,” (20 May
1846), 2 (quote), and “Individual Liability,” (27 May 1846), 2.

45

Debates (16 July 1847), 1083. S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 69, 70, 71 & 72.

46

Debates (24 July 1847), 1125. Also, see The Examiner, 21 July 1847, 2.
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expressed similar concerns. “Charters might be necessary in some cases,
but unless a stop were put to it, there would be nothing but Corporations
from one end of the country to the other.” Supporters of the bill, such as
William Buell Richards, a reformer and close friend of Richard Baldwin,
pointed to the success of New York warehouses, which enjoyed limited
liability. The Inspector General, Francis Hincks, was also opposed limited
liability, but offered as a compromise the commandite principle granting
limited liability to shareholders but making directors personally liable to
the full extent of their property. This was acceptable to all concerned.47
Later that session, the Legislative Council, the appointed branch of the
legislature, adopted a general incorporation bill for manufacturing, mining,
mechanical and chemical concerns, modeled on the recent New York
statute, and referred it to the Assembly for its approval. The bill provided
that shareholders were personally liable for debts of the corporation until
their stock was paid up, but afterwards their liability was limited to their
investment, with one exception: as in New York shareholders remained
personally liable for servants’ wages. The bill faced considerable
opposition from those who objected to the extension of limited liability
and although it received three readings, the motion to declare that the bill
passed was put over for further debate. In the interim, the bill was lost
when the Parliament buildings were burned down over the Rebellion
Losses bill and the Assembly was prorogued before further action could be
taken.48
47

Debates (15 March 1849), 1347-49. S. Prov. Can., c. 192, s. 3, 4. Later that session the
legislature passed without debate a statute providing for the creation of limited
partnerships in Upper Canada. S. Prov. Can. 1849, c. 75. It followed the commandite
principle, limiting the liability of passive investors to the amount of their investment, but
keeping active partners personally liable for the debts of the partnership.
48

Debates (9, 16 & 18 April 1849), 1788-90, 1895, 1956; Journals of the Legislative
Assembly of the Province of Canada (10 May 1849), 287; Currie, “First Dominion,” 391.
That session general incorporation statutes were passed for companies engaged in the
construction of roads, bridges, piers and wharves but neither provided for stockholder
liability. See, S. Prov. Can. 1849, c. 56 & 84. . As well, a limited partnership statute for
Upper Canada was passed that permitted partnerships with general partners, who were
personally liable for the partnership’s liabilities, and special partners who were not. See
S. Prov. Can. 1849, c. 75.
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The issue came before the Legislative Assembly the following year, but
the lapse of time had not changed anyone’s views. Francis Hincks spoke
of the unfairness of allowing small capitalists to enter into competition
with mechanics when they were relieved of responsibility for their debts
while mechanics were not, and Henry Sherwood insisted that active
managers should be held responsible for the corporation’s liabilities, while
supporters of the legislation pointed to its beneficial effects in promoting
prosperity in the United States. The bill passed, including the provision
making shareholders personally liable “for all debts that may be due and
owing to all or any of the laborers, servants and apprentices thereof, for
services performed for such Company.” Personal liability, however, only
arose after a judgment obtained against the company could not be
executed.49 The enactment of this statute effectively put to an end
parliamentary debate over the principle of limited liability,50 and radical
populists, who became known as the Clear Grits, turned their attention to
other matters.51
The Canadian economy entered into a period of strong growth in the
1850s, fuelled by the rising demand for Canadian staples and the rapid
expansion of the railway network. As well, Canadian manufacturing also
began to make advances in textiles, agricultural implements and
woodworking.52 Prior to Confederation in 1867, however, only a small
49

Debates, (10 & 27 June, 15, 22 & 24 July 1850), 464-67, 1204-05; Currie, “First
Dominion,” 391-93; S. Prov. Canada, 1850, c. 28, s. 11.
50

There was a confused debate in 1855 over a bill to incorporate the Montreal
Locomotive Manufacturing Company. A number of members objected to limited
liability because the objects of the company were broadly defined so as to allow it to
compete with small producers who lacked this protection. The matter was resolved by
limiting the company’s area of business. No provision was made for either shareholder
or director liability for workers’ wages. See Debates (12 April 1855), 2745-47; S. Prov.
Canada 1855, c 221.

51
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Careless, Union, 166-84; “Our Platform,” The North American, (3 January 1851), 2.

Careless, Union, 132-49; John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and
Economic Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1980); Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, A Concise History of
Business in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 170-85.
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minority of businesses adopted a corporate form, mostly in the areas of
transportation and finance, activities that were not covered by the general
incorporation statute of 1850, which initially could be used to create
companies engaged in manufacturing, ship building, mining, or the
mechanical and chemical business.53 Entrepreneurs carrying on covered
activities, however, were not compelled to incorporate under the general
act and could and, indeed, did seek to incorporate through special acts of
the legislature, as of course did those engaged in businesses outside the
scope of the act. A complete survey of these special incorporation statutes
has not been conducted, but a sampling indicates that railway and
steamship companies were typically incorporated without provision for
personal liability for unpaid workers’ wages, while mining and
manufacturing statutes either made no provision for personal liability or
made directors liable for unpaid workers’ wages.54 Shareholders were
rarely made liable for unpaid workers’ wages in special incorporation
statutes.55
The shift from shareholder to director liability was strengthened by an
1860 statute that allowed industries covered by the existing general
incorporation scheme to also incorporate by judicial decree and again by
53

For data on incorporation in Upper Canada, see Risk, “Nineteenth-Century,” 304-05.
The scope of the general incorporation statute was expanded over the decade to include,
among others, public hotels, the supply of gas and water, road construction, timberworks
and fishing. See S. Prov. Can. 1853, c. 122, 124, 190, 191; S. Prov. Can. 1858, c. 90.

54

For example, the Montreal and Kingston Railway Co. (S. Prov. Canada 1851, c. 143),
the Montreal Ocean Steamship Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 44), and the Collingwood
Cotton Manufacturing Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1859, c. 110) made no provision for personal
liability, while the Megantic Mining Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 49), the Shipton Slate
Works Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 53) made directors personally liable for unpaid
workers’ wages. A number of general incorporation statutes for public utilities were also
enacted in the 1850s, none of which included director or shareholder liability for
workers’ wages. For example, see S. Prov. Can. 1852, c. 10 (telegraphs); S. Prov. Can.
1853, c. 124 (harbours), c. 173 (gas and water works), c. 190 (river improvements).
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For example, see S. Prov. Can. 1851, c. 64. For an overview of liability provisions, as
well as a table that breaks down incorporations in Upper Canada prior to 1867 by year,
industry and type of incorporation, see Risk, “Nineteenth Century,” 295-98, 304-05..
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an 1861 statute that standardized the terms under which covered industries
became incorporated by special statute. Indeed, that statute also
reinforced wage protection by making director liability for unpaid
workers’ wages a standard term of future special incorporation statutes at a
time when legislative practice varied considerably.56 One blip in this
picture was the 1864 statute that created a procedure for incorporation by
letters patent, which made no provision for personal liability for workers’
wages. This omission, however, seems to have been an oversight rather
than a conscious change of policy since director liability for unpaid
workers’ wages was included when the letters patent regime was adopted
five years later in the first post-confederation Canadian general
incorporation statute.57
Research to date has not uncovered any discussion of the switch from
shareholder to director liability during this period. Christopher Dunkin, a
Conservative lawyer elected to represent a riding in the Eastern Townships
of Lower Canada, introduced the 1860 and 1861 general incorporation
statutes providing for director liability, but there is no record of any
legislative debate or of his motivations.58 Hence we are largely left to
speculate both as to the reasons for the switch and for the apparent absence
of any controversy over the change. For those concerned about the
unfairness of allowing some businesses to operate without responsibility
for their debts, it is probably safe to presume that they cared little about
whether it was shareholders or directors who were held personally
56

S. Prov. Can. 1860, c. 31, ss. 47, 48, and 53; S. Prov. Can .1861, c. 18, ss. 33, 34 and
39. For a discussion of these changes and the uncertainty surrounding the motivation, see
Currie, “First Dominion,” 396-98.
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S. Prov. Can. 1864, c. 23; S.C. 1869, c. 13. Director liability for workers’ wages was
also made a standard term of post-confederation Canadian special incorporation statutes.
S.C. 1869, c. 12.
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On Dunkin, see entry in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online
http://www.biographi.ca/EN/index.html (5 March 2007). Previous researchers have
noted the dearth of materials on the background to these various incorporation statutes.
For example, see Currie, “First Dominion,” 396-98; F.W. Wegenast, The Law of
Canadian Companies (Toronto: Burroughs, 1931), 21.
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responsible, as long as some corporate actors were. The 1850 statute was
modeled on the New York State law, which contained shareholder
liability, and so that is why shareholder liability was first adopted.
However, as noted, earlier legislation had adopted the limited partnership
model in which managing partners were personally responsible for the
debts of the partnership, an arrangement that also satisfied the opponents
of limited liability incorporation. Moreover, it was a notable feature of all
of these incorporation statutes was that directors were required to be
shareholders, 59 and so director liability for unpaid workers wages simply
meant placing personal responsibility for unpaid workers’ wages on the
shoulders of the sub-set of shareholders who managed the corporation.
While the above may provide a plausible explanation for the absence of
opposition to the shift from shareholder to director responsibility for
unpaid workers’ wages, it does account for why it occurred. Given that
the practice of holding directors liable for unpaid workers wages became
widespread in special incorporation statutes for mining and manufacturing
companies and was later adopted in general incorporation statutes for
private industry, it is fair to assume that incorporators and their lawyers
were either indifferent between shareholder and director liability, and
merely followed a precedent once it was set, or that they actively preferred
director liability to shareholder liability. The problem with the first
scenario is that the default statutory position after 1850 was shareholder
liability and so we would need to determine how and when the precedent
subsequently and unintentionally changed. It is more probable that
director liability was preferred for a number of reasons, the most important
likely being that it facilitated the participation of passive investors in the
corporation by absolutely their liability to the amount of their initial
investment. While this may not have been a major concern for the family
controlled firms that predominated in most of the sectors covered by the
1850 legislation and its extensions, it would have been for the small

59

S. Prov. Can. 1850, c. 28, s. 4; S. Prov. Can. 1860, c. 31, s. 18; S. Prov. Can. 1861, c.
18, s. 9.
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minority of large companies that hoped to raise capital through the sale of
shares to outside investors.60
A second and related but more abstract consideration may have been that
shareholder liability was viewed as less consistent with the principle that
the corporation had a distinct legal personality from that of its owners than
was director liability. This principle had no basis in common law but had
to be created by statute, including the grant of limited liability to
shareholders.61 The immunity of directors, however, was rooted in the
common law of agency insofar as directors were construed as agents and
not as principles of the corporation. Indeed, incorporation statutes did not
grant directors limited liability, but rather imposed personal liability on
directors for a variety of actions that harmed creditors’ interests. Thus the
imposition of director liability for workers’ wages was an incremental
addition to a regime that already recognized the legitimacy of holding
directors personally liable for some actions of the corporation.62 In short,
while incorporators presumably would have preferred no personal liability
for workers’ wages, they operated in a political environment in which that
option was not usually available to private enterprise and so settled on
directors’ liability as being marginally preferable to shareholder liability.

60

On the predominance of small firms and the slow growth of the Canadian securities
market during this period, see Taylor and Baskerville, Concise History, 181-85, 217-25
and Ranald C. Michie, “The Canadian Securities Market, 1850-1914,” Business History
Review 62 (1988): 35-73.
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It should be noted, however, that by virtue of the 1849 Interpretation Act, limited
liability was enjoyed by all corporations unless express exception were made. See, S.
Prov. Can. 1849, c. 10, s. 5(24). This did not change the practice of making express
provision for limited shareholder liability in both general and special incorporation
statutes.
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The distinct legal foundations of limited liability for shareholders and directors’
liability was one that was not always clearly recognized and is still often overlooked in
current jurisprudence and debates. See Robert Flannigan, “The Personal Tort Liability of
Directors,” Canadian Bar Review 81 (2002): 247-322 at 248. For example of director
liability, see S. Prov. Can. 1850, c. 28, s. 14 (paying dividends out of capital).
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In any event, director liability became the norm in most pre- and postConfederation private enterprise incorporation statutes.63
In sum, at least until the mid-century the principle that shareholders were
entirely separate from the corporation and should not be responsible for its
debts was not fully accepted. Incorporation with limited liability for
investors was still considered a privilege granted by the state to promote
public purposes. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, legislators were
increasingly accepting the view that it was justifiable to grant this
privilege to private entrepreneurs because it facilitated investment in
capital-intensive enterprises. Nevertheless, they also recognized that
servants were not in a position to protect themselves contractually against
the risk of non-payment of wages, especially since master and servant law
compelled them to provide service on penalty of prosecution.64 In these
circumstances, making shareholders or directors personally responsible for
63

For example, see S.Q. 1868, c. 25, s. 48; S.C. 1869, c. 12, s. 40; S.C. 1869, c. 13; S.O.
1874, s. 52; S.M. 1875, c. 28, s. 52; Companies Ordinance, N.W.T. 1901, c. 20, s. 54 S.S.
1915, c. 14, s. 103. The issue of limited liability corporations also arose in Nova Scotia.
Early reformers Joseph Howe and William Young unsuccessfully opposed limited
shareholder liability for banking corporations in the 1830s, but it became increasingly
common for the legislature to insert some form of shareholder liability into incorporation
acts passed during the 1830s and 1840s. In 1851 Nova Scotia enacted a limited
partnerships act based on the commandite principle (R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 79), but the
general incorporation statute, passed the same year, made no provision for limited
investor liability (R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 87. In S.N.S. 1862, c. 2, the principle of double
liability was adopted, but even this form of limited liability was omitted in its general
incorporation act of 1873 (S.N.S. 1873, c. 13. Full limited liability for shareholders only
became a permanent feature of Nova Scotia corporation law in 1883 and was
accompanied by director liability for unpaid workers’ wages (S.N.S. 1883, c. 24, s. 69).
Special incorporation statutes, however, contained a variety of liability provisions. The
1883 act was not repealed, but a footnote to the 1900 Revised Statute Act stated that it
was effectively superseded by the chapter “of Joint Stock Companies” published as
R.S.N.S. 1900, c. 128. For discussion of nineteenth-century developments, see Patton,
“From State Action” and Davidson, “Industry and the Development.”
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Indeed, in 1847 the government enacted a master and servant statute applicable in
Upper Canada to make it clear that workers could be prosecuted and punished for
breaching their contracts. S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 23; Paul Craven, “The Law of Master
and Servant in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario,” in David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the
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unpaid workers’ wages owed by the corporation was adopted as a
condition of granting limited liability to private investors in for-profit
corporations. The switch to director liability may have reflected a change
in view about the appropriate allocation of responsibility within the
corporation, but not about the principle that workers’ wages must the
protected by the imposition of personal liability on some set of corporate
actors.65

III. FROM CONDITION TO EXCEPTION: JUDICIAL
SUBORDINATION OF WAGE PROTECTION TO THE
NORM OF LIMITED LIABILITY, ROUND 1
The understanding that shareholder or director liability for workers’ wages
was a condition of the statutory grant of the privilege of limited liability to
for-profit corporations was, for the most part, lost or ignored by the
judiciary they came to interpret the legislation.
Instead, judges
constructed an inverted view of that relationship, making limited liability
the dominant legal norm and shareholder or director liability for workers
wages an exceptional privilege to be narrowly construed. This inversion,
however, was neither immediate nor total. A minority of judges gave
priority to workers’ wage claims and this produced some controversy and
inconsistency.
The conflict between wage protection and limited liability primarily
played itself out in a series of cases that raised the question of the personal
scope of wage protection.66 This was a problem because employment
statutes in the nineteenth and often continuing into the twentieth centuries
were written in the idiom of master and servant law, repeating its
65

Banking corporations were an exception, as well some corporations providing public
utilities. For example, see S. Prov. Canada 1850, c. 21 (banking); S. Prov. Can. 1853, c.
173 (gas and water). Also see Labrie and Palmer, “Pre-Confederation History,” 53-60.
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A second issue was the technical preconditions that had to be satisfied before
shareholders or directors could be held liable.
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classification of service providers. The New York general incorporation
statute was typical. It extended wage protection to “laborers, servants and
apprentices.” This language was copied in pre- and post-confederation
Canadian general incorporation statutes, and was later modified in federal
and some provincial statutes by the addition of “clerks” to this list.67 It is
unclear, however, to what extent legislators were cognizant of the
traditional meaning of these categories. For example, in 1847 the
Province of Canada enacted a local master and servant law for Upper
Canada after a judicial decision cast doubt on whether the relevant English
law had been received in the colony. That act applied to “servants and
labourers.”68 Questions were subsequently raised about whether the law
covered skilled workers and to remove any doubt the statute was amended
in 1855 to specify that it applied to “journeymen or skilled labourers in
any trade, calling, craft or employment.”69
As the above example indicates, the development of a unified legal
category of “employee” and of a general concept of a contract of
employment followed a slow and tortuous path, as the content and social
underpinnings of master and servant law were being transformed.
Between 1850 and 1920, Canada and Ontario in particular, underwent two
industrial revolutions. The first was characterized by the growth of
factory production, which entailed large concentrations of workers,
mechanization and a more refined division of labour, while the second was
marked by the concentration of ownership in large corporations, the
development of mass production techniques with a reduction in the
dependence of skilled labour, and increased managerial control over
production.70 As a result, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
67

S.C. 1877, c. 43, s. 69. The Act also reduced director liability from one year to six
months’ wages. This language was used in the Northwest Territories legislation (N.W.T.
1901, c. 20, s. 54) and kept in the subsequent Alberta legislation.

68

69
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S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 23, s. 1.
S. Prov. Can. 1855, c. 136.

Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism 1867-1892
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 18-34; Brian D. Palmer, Working-Class
Experience (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 81-87, 117-21, 155-63; Craig Heron,

2008]

LIMITED LIABILITY TO EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY

29

centuries it was increasingly difficult to determine the legal meaning of
traditional master and servant categories. In England, where the hold of
master and servant law was arguably greater than in British North
America,71 courts were often confronted with the question of the personal
scope of both disciplinary and protective legislation that invoked its
categories. According to Simon Deakin, the outcome was commonly
determined on the basis of the type of legislation and the view of the
judges of its appropriate scope.72
Disputes over the coverage of employment legislation were neither as
pervasive nor severe in the United States and Canada as they were in
England, but the issue grew in importance in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. Indeed, in 1908 C.B. Labatt, the associate editor of
the Canada Law Journal and the author of a three-volume treatise on
Anglo-American master and servant law published in 1904, wrote a
lengthy article on the scope of wage protection statutes, in which he
described the state of the decisions as “extremely conflicting.”73 When
“The Second Industrial Revolution in Canada, 1890-1930,” in Deian R. Hopkins and
Gregory S. Kealey, eds., Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and
Canada 1850-1930 (Wales: LLAFUR/CCLH, 1989), 48-66.
71

On England, see Douglas Hay, “England,” and “Master and Servant in England,” in
William Steinmetz, ed., Social Inequality in the Industrial Age (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 227-64. On Canada, see Paul Craven, “Canada,” 1670
72

Simon Deakin, “Legal origins of wage labour: the evolution of the contract of
employment from industrialization to the welfare state,” in Linda Clarke, Peter de Gijsel,
and Jörn Janssen, eds. The Dynamics of Wage Relations in the New Europe (Boston:
Kluwer, 2000), 32-43; “The Contract of Employment: A Study of Legal Evolution,”
Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 11 (Spring 2001): 1-36. Also see Simon Deakin
and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), ch. 2 and Robert J. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the
Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
73

C.B. Labatt, “What Persons Are Within the Purview of Statutes Affecting the
Enforcement of Claims for Services,” Canada Law Journal 44 (1908): 369-427, at 370.
C.B. Labatt, Commentaries on the Law of Master and Servant (Rochester, NY: Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing, 1904). A greatly expanded second edition was published in
1913.
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faced with the interpretation of such provisions, the courts had a choice of
interpretive starting points. To greatly simplify, on the one hand, they
could resort to rules of statutory interpretation to help resolve ambiguities.
The problem, however, was that judges faced a choice from among a
number of inconsistent rules. For example, as Labatt noted, judges could
either adopt the rule of noscitur a sociis according to which a general word
was to be read restrictively if it appeared in a phrase surrounded by
narrower terms, or they could start from the presumption that each word in
a phrase has been used to express a distinct idea.74 As well, they also had
the choice of defining the terms in relation to increasingly archaic
distinctions drawn from English master and servant law or interpreting
them in light of the emerging more general category of employment. The
interpretive choices made by judges, however, were only partially driven
by their preferences among competing canons of statutory interpretation or
views about the meaningfulness of traditional service categories. At least
as important, were two inter-related substantive differences: first, whether
the judge viewed limited liability as a statutory privilege or as a basic legal
norm and second whether the judge saw shareholder or director liability
for workers’ wages as a penal or as a remedial provision.
The issue of the coverage of shareholder liability for workers’ wages first
arose under the New York law and because that jurisprudence influenced
early Canadian cases it is appropriate to start the analysis there. The
earliest reported decision in New York, Conant v. Van Schaick, took an
expansive view of the statute, holding that the term “servant” included
engineers, master mechanics, and conductors as well as “the man who
shovels gravel.” 75 The only exceptions were corporate officers and agents.
Moreover, the court also found that the workers’ cause of action was
assignable. This facilitated the ability of some merchants who extended
credit to workers to sue when the corporation defaulted on wages.
Subsequent decisions confirmed the exclusion of officers and agents from
protection, and also held that shareholders were not liable under the act for

74

Labatt, “What Persons,” 370-71.

75

(1857) 24 Barb. 87 at 99.
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debts owed by the corporation to large and small contractors.76 More
controversial was the status of professional and supervisory employees. In
one early case involving a special incorporation statute that limited
shareholder wage liability to laborers and operatives, the court excluded a
professional engineer on the ground that the law and underlying policy
aimed to protect manual laborers, not professional men who were well
qualified to look after themselves.77 This decision was distinguished in
subsequent cases involving a working overseer, bookkeeper, civil
engineer, and reporter/assistant editor.78
Judgments in two later cases, however, opted decisively for a narrower
view of the term “servant.” The second of those cases, Wakefield v.
Fargo, included a claim by a bookkeeper/general manager. In support of
his argument that the plaintiff did not come within the ambit of the statute,
the lawyer for the shareholders characterized the statutory imposition of
liability for workers’ wages as “a penalty and nothing else” and argued
that the provision should be strictly construed. As well, the lawyer
claimed the statute was “designed to protect persons unable to protect
themselves by reason of the character of the laborer, as a class supposed
and assumed to be ignorant, careless and weak.”79 Danforth J., speaking
for the court, agreed.
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Richardson v. Abendroth (1864) 43 Barb. 162 held that an officer could sue, but was
overruled by Coffin v. Reynolds (1868) 37 NY Rep. 639. Hill v. Spencer (1874) 61 NY
Rep. 274 and Dean v. De Wolf (1878) 16 Hun. 186 (excluding agents); Aikin v. Wasson
(1862) 24 NY Rep. 482 (excluding contractors). The distinction between servants or
employees and independent contractors then as now is a difficult one to draw.
77

Ericsson v. Brown (1862) 38 Barb. 390 at 392.
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Hovey v. Ten Broeck (1865) 3 Rob. 316 (overseer and bookkeeper); Williamson v.
Wadsworth (1867) 49 Barb. 294 (civil engineer); Harris v. Norvell (1876) 1 Abb. N.C
127 (reporter, assistant editor).
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Wakefield v. Fargo et al. (1882) 90 NY 213, at 215. The earlier case, Krauser v.
Ruckel (1879) 17 Hun. 463 disallowed a claim by a superintendent of mine works.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

32

[VOL. 04 NO. 02

A stockholder is not liable for the general debts
of a corporation, if the statute creating it has been
complied with. The clause in question creates a
privileged class, into which none but the humblest
employees are admitted…. It is plain we think, that
the services referred to are menial or manual services
– that he who performs them must be of a class
whose members usually look to the reward of a day’s
labor, or service, for immediate or present support,
for whom the company does not expect credit, and to
whom its future ability to pay is of no consequence;
one who is responsible for no independent action, but
who does a day’s work, or a stated job under the
direction of a superior.80
Danforth J. continued with an expostulation on the hierarchy of service
relationships drawn from Blackstone and earlier New York cases. He
admitted that the word servant might be read broadly to include all who
provide service “in this instance, from the one who dips or bottles the
water, to the president” but quickly added that “this would manifestly be
too general.” He then turned to the other service classifications:
“Laborer or apprentice” are words of limited
meaning, and refer to a particular class of persons
employed for a defined and low grade of
service…They necessarily exclude persons of higher
dignity….A statute which treats of persons of an
inferior rank cannot by any general word be so
extended as to embrace a superior. The word
“servant” must be construed by its associates. It
stands between “laborer” and “apprentice,” and can
represent no higher degree of employment.81
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Wakefield, ibid. 217-18.
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Ibid. 219.
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Thus we see a complete inversion of the idea that limited liability is a
privilege granted to shareholders on condition that they remain personally
responsible for the payment of workers’ wages if the corporation defaults.
In Danforth J.’s view, wage protection is a privilege only given to a
narrowly defined segment of workers located at the bottom end of an
eighteenth-century hierarchical ordering of service relations. As a
practical matter, Danforth J.’s approach meant that those covered by the
statute were unlikely to benefit from it since the class of protected workers
would, by his definition, not be owed more than a day or two of wages,
while skilled, managerial and professional employees who could benefit
from the statute because of the larger amount of wages paid in arrears
were not covered.82
Although business failure was a common occurrence in Canada during the
second half of the nineteenth century, for reasons that are not apparent
there are no reported Canadian cases interpreting wage liability provisions
until the 1890s.83 Even before cases reached the courts, however, limited
liability was becoming entrenched as a basic legal norm. For instance, by
the time Montreal lawyer Charles Henry Stephens authored a treatise on
joint stock companies in 1881, the idea of limited liability as a privilege
conferred on condition that workers’ wages were protected was so alien
that Stephens thought it would “require some ingenuity to discover” why
directors should be personally liable in respect of wages more than in
connection with matters within the scope of their duties. Fortunately, in
82

I have not traced the development of New York case law on shareholder liability
beyond Wakefield, however, it is worth noting that Labatt’s global assessment of
American jurisprudence was that it narrowly construed shareholder liability because it
was in derogation of the common law, imposed new liabilities, or was penal in nature.
See Labatt, “What Persons,” 407.
83

On the rate of business failure, see Taylor and Baskerville, Concise History, 173. In
part the absence of earlier case may reflect the slow rate at which Canadian entrepreneurs
took advantage of the corporate form, although almost 4,000 firms incorporated in
Ontario between 1867 and 1906. See Fecteau, “Petites Républiques,” 53-54 and Michie,
“Canadian Securities,” 42. It is possible that there were previous lower court judgments
that went unreported, however, research to date has not identified any discussion of
director liability in any published legal source, apart from Stephens, Law and Practice,
see below.
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his eyes, their liability was hedged with so many conditions that there
would be very few cases in which directors would be “condemned to
pay.”84
Stephens’ view proved to be correct when the first case on the issue
reached the high courts in 1895. Mr. Welch was engaged as a foreman
engaged the British America Starch Works to superintend a construction
project at the company’s factory in Brantford, Ontario. When the
company failed to pay he sued and obtained judgment, but when the
execution was returned nulla bona, he brought an action against the
shareholders. Welch’s agreement with the company stipulated that it
would employ the men necessary for the work but that he would pay them
out of pocket and be reimbursed every fortnight. As well, the company
agreed to pay him $5.00 a day and another $2.00 a day for the use of a
steam pump he provided. When work was completed, the company failed
to pay $225.55 owing to Welch. He sued, recovered judgment by default
and, after unsuccessfully attempting to collect from the company, he
brought an application against Ellis, a director of the corporation. The
trial judge held that Welch was not a labourer, servant or apprentice within
the meaning of the statute, and Welch appealed.
His lawyers argued that the provision in question ought to be broadly
construed since it aimed to protect persons who could not protect
themselves. They also argued that the term servant “is as wide a term as
can be used to define a person employed by another.”85 Ellis’s lawyers
countered that Welch was neither a workman nor a labourer, but rather a
contractor who was not protected by the Act. In the alternative, they
submitted that even if Welch was a servant in the wide sense of the term,
its meaning in the statute was restricted because it was used in conjunction
with the terms “labourer” and “apprentice,” thereby connoting an intent to
84

Charles Henry Stephens, The Law and Practice of Joint Stock companies under the
Canadian Acts (Toronto: Carswell, 1881), 367-69. He suggested tongue-in-cheek that it
might serve as “a check upon the tendency to make money by the appointment of
relations at good fat salaries.”(368). The entire passage is reproduced in C.A. Masten,
Canadian Company Law (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1901), 262.
85

Welch v. Ellis (1895), 22 O.A.R. 255, at 257.
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include only servants whose substantial occupation was the performance
of manual labour.86
The Ontario court of appeal agreed with Ellis’s lawyers. Osler, J.A. noted
that the provision was borrowed from the New York statute and then
quoted Wakefield for the proposition that the act only covered servants
performing menial or manual services. In Osler, J.A’s view the maxim
noscitur a sociis applied and it did not matter that Welch was paid by the
day. MacLennan, J.A., wrote a separate concurring opinion that took a
purposive approach to statutory interpretation, albeit one bereft of any
historical or policy analysis. Rather, MacLennan, J.A. asserted, “it is
evident to my mind that it was not intended to give this suretyship to any
but the humblest class of wage earners, the loss of whose wages might be
productive of great distress to themselves and their families.” But as the
judgment continued, MacLennan, J.A. invoked another policy reason for
reading the statute narrowly. It “cast the burden of suretyship upon
persons not otherwise liable; in fact imposes upon the directors a penal
liability for the default of the company, though they may have been guilty
of no wrong whatever.”87
The characterization of the act as “penal” did not go unchallenged in
subsequent judgments and it is instructive to explore these differences. In
Ontario, Riddell J.’s opinion in Lee v. Friedman voiced the strongest
alternative to Welch. That case was not about the scope of coverage, but
rather raised the question of whether there could be an equitable
assignment of the wages to a third party who could then recover against
directors if the company failed to pay the workers. In this case, the
plaintiff, Lee, was a local merchant who made an arrangement with the
Wilbur Iron Ore Co. and its employees whereby he provided goods to the
employees on credit and the employees agreed that the company would
deduct the amounts they owed to Lee from their wages and pay Lee
directly. Riddell J. articulated a different interpretive starting point than
the one in Welch:
86

Ibid.
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Ibid, 262.

36

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 02

No doubt from the point of view of the directors, the
Act may be somewhat drastic-but what of the
workmen? The Legislature had to face this situation:
when a company fails and does not pay its workmen,
are the workmen, who had nothing to do with the
management of the company, and could not know
anything about the company’s prosperity, to suffer, or
are those who had all to do with the management,
either directly or through the man they appointed, and
who knew or ought to have known all about its
financial condition?
The answer given by the Legislature is that the
directors must bear some part of the loss at least –
and while it is “penal” as regards the directors, it is
highly remedial as regards the workmen.88
Thus, while Riddell J. did not challenge the norm of limited liability, he
recognized that it was in conflict with the legislature’s remedial purpose of
protecting workers who are unable to protect themselves. In the result, the
court refused to read narrowly the scope of protection and held that in the
circumstances of this case an equitable assignment had occurred and that
the assignee of the wages could collect against the directors.
This interpretive approach, privileging the remedial thrust of wage
protection over the norm of limited liability, ultimately failed to displace
the strict constructionist approach in Ontario. Subsequent decisions of the
Ontario courts on the issue of assignment distinguished Lee on its facts,89
while those on scope of employment held that actors and working
managers were not covered.90 Riddell J. participated in many of these
88

Lee v. Friedman (1909), 20 O.L.R. 49; cited to [1909] O.J. No. 5 at paras. 42-43.
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Olson v. Machin (1912), 8 D.L.R. 188 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (company deducted wages at
source and paid directly to boarding house keeper); Coveney v. Glendenning (1915), 22
D.L.R. 461 (Ont. S.C.) (similar arrangement for storekeeper).
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Ryan v. Wills (1918), 43 O.L.R. 624 (S.C. (A.D.)) (actress under contract); Domanski
v. Wilson, et al. [1935] O.R. 400 (C.A.).
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later decisions but never again invoked the remedial purpose of the act to
allow wage protection to trump limited liability.91
Quebec judges also split on the nature of the provision. In the first
reported Quebec case, Fee v. Turner, the court adopted a purposive
approach, taking the view that the act aimed “to protect to a limited extent
those who were employed by such companies in positions which do not
enable them to judge with any special intelligence what is the company’s
real financial position.”92 Since directors did or should have knowledge of
the danger of a financial collapse, it was “not inequitable” to hold them
responsible for the wages of workers whose services they continued to
utilize. This obligation, however, did not extend to managers, accountants
or other employees who could know whether the company’s operations
were being successfully carried out.93 This analysis, however, was not
applied in subsequent decisions, which reached inconsistent results. Thus
in Pilote v. Leclerc et al.94 and Leclerc v. Beaulieu et al.95 the court held
that the director liability provision of the Quebec general incorporation
91

Cases in which Riddell was involved include Olson, Ryan, and Domanski, (above). as
well as Mullen v. Millar (1924), 55 O.L.R. 563 (S.C. H.C.J.) aff’d at [1925] 2 D.L.R. 321
(S.C. (A.D.)) (prospectors retained by company but never instructed to go into field
unable to collect from directors on judgment against company for breach of its agreement
to pay them for their travel and waiting time). Claimants lost in each of these cases.
Riddell had a lengthy judicial career, but is perhaps best remembered as a prolific legal
historian who wrote across a wide range of topics, mostly in a descriptive manner. For
example, see William Renwick Riddell, “Labor Legislation in Canada,” Minnesota Law
Review 5 (1921): 243-52. For a short biographical sketch and a partial list of his
writings, see an obituary, E-Fabre Surveyer, “The Honourable William Renwick Riddell,
Revue du Barreau 5 (1945): 526-29.
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statute was penal in nature, while in Dallaire v. Leclerc et al.96 it
concluded it was civil.
Courts in Alberta initially adopted a broader view of the scope of their
act’s coverage, which included the term “clerks.” For example, in
Yellowhead Pass Coal & Coke, Beck, J. did not find the rules of statutory
interpretation very helpful and held that the statute covered a mine
superintendent, bookkeeper, and company doctor, but not the auditor.97 In
a subsequent case, Crowder v. Coleman, the Alberta Court of Appeal,
relying on Yellowhead, held that a mine manager was covered because he
had nothing to do with the financial management of the business. Yet the
court also held there must be strict compliance with the requirements for
returning a judgment unsatisfied because the statute “gives an
extraordinary remedy” (Beck J.A.) and because the remedy against the
directors was “purely statutory (Clarke, J.A.). Although Stuart J.A. was of
the view that the statute was remedial and should be interpreted flexibly
“to meet the clear intent of and spirit of the enactment, he reluctantly
concurred with his colleagues.98 A similar approach was adopted in
Stevens v. Spencer et al., with a similar result. Tweedie J. held that a
mining engineer hired to superintend the construction of a mine was a
servant, but the conditions precedent to recovery against director must be
strictly performed because it was “an extraordinary right.”99 There was no
suggestion either that incorporation as a limited liability corporation was a
statutory privilege or that the wage liability provision was remedial and
therefore entitled to a liberal construction.
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(1918), 53 C.S. 201 at 207.
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Re Yellowhead Pass Coal & Coke Company, Ltd. (1917), 12 Alta. L.R. 144, at 149-50.
Also, see Crew v. Dallas (1908), 9 W.L.R. 598 (miner paid by results is covered).
98

99
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The judgment that most fully embraced this alternative view was that of
Albert Elsworth Richards’100 in Macdonald v. Drake, a decision of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal. The case did not deal with the scope of
coverage, but rather with a claim by the defendants that they were not
liable as directors because they each lacked a prescribed qualification to be
a director. The court unanimously rejected this technical defense as well
as the claim that the statute should be strictly construed. According to
Richards, J.A.:
The claim that the liability under s. 33 is a
penalty seems to me incorrect. Providing that such
liability shall exist on the part of directors is, I think,
withholding from them, in respect of wages, the
freedom which the statute would otherwise give them
from personal liability for debts of the Company.
…[P]ersons doing business jointly together
without the benefit of a limited liability Act , are each
liable for all the debts of the joint concern. That is
the ordinary position. The limited liability granted by
some statutes to shareholders in corporations is a
special privilege, abrogating the ordinary liability of
each for all debts. In granting such limit to liability
there is nothing unjust in providing that the ordinary
liability shall again exist in certain cases. That is all
the Legislature has done by enacting section 33.101
Although this judgment was followed in the only other reported Manitoba
case on director’s liability prior to World War II, courts in other provinces
100

Albert Elswood Richards was the grandson of William Buell Richards who as reform
member of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada supported the enactment
of the general incorporation statute in 1849 and again in 1850. For a brief biography, see
Dale Brawn, The Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, 1870-1950: A Biographical
Sketch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) (I am thankful to Professor Brawn
for giving me pre-publication access to this material).
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did not cite it, although a 1916 treatise on Canadian company law by
Montreal lawyer Victor E. Mitchell adopted the Manitoba position without
reference to contrary views.102
In sum, by the 1930s, despite some variation, the predominant approach of
the courts was to treat limited liability as the norm and director liability for
workers’ wages as the exception. This view was most clearly articulated
by F.W. Wegenast in his treatise on company law, published in 1931,
which became the standard work on the subject for many years. In his
opinion, the idea that director liability for workers’ wages merely withheld
from directors the immunity that they otherwise would have been granted
by statute was “[h]istorically and logically” inapplicable to a chartered
company.103 He did not elaborate on this argument, but rather referenced
an earlier discussion in the treatise where he explained limited liability as
a logical extension of the corporation’s separate legal personality and not
as a statutory privilege.104 This perspective exemplified the triumph in the
first decades of the twentieth century of what David Millon describes as
the “natural entity theory of the corporation.” Unlike the earlier theory,
which viewed the corporation as an artificial entity created by the state to
promote public policy objectives, the new theory naturalized the
corporation as a legal person, no different in principle than a natural
person vested with rights like those of ordinary citizens. In a similar vein,
Paddy Ireland notes that in late-nineteenth century England, the law
102
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increasingly viewed corporations as entities made by people, not of
them.105 As the courts naturalized the separate legal personality of the
corporation and the limited liability of the human beings who created and
managed them, the idea that these were privileges faded from view.
Although not all judges and commentators accepted this approach, 106 most
did.
The coverage of wage protection legislation was only legislatively
expanded to reflect the emergence of a more general conception of the
category of employment after World War II. For example, in Ontario the
definition of protected workers was expanded by the addition of the words
“and other wage earners” after “apprentice” in 1953 when the Companies
Act was substantially revised and recast as the Corporations Act, and it
was only in 1970 that the term “employee” was inserted to delineate who
was entitled to claim against directors for unpaid wages. Even then the
break with the idiom of master and servant was incomplete as the act
further stipulated that coverage was limited to employees “to whom the
Master and Servant Act applies.”107 That qualification was dropped in a

105

Millon, “Theories of the Corporation,” 211-16; Ireland, “Capitalism without
Capitalists,” 47. The Canadian business press publicized the emerging English view. For
example, the Monetary And Commercial Times (1871) 4:28, 549, reprinted an excerpt
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See, for example, Marie-Louis Beaulieu, “De la Responsibilité des Directeurs de
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1982 overhaul.108 Federally, the term “employee” only displaced the list
of protected workers in 1974.109
By this time the courts also accepted the broadened scope of personal
protection. In 1974, the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissive of the
authority of Welch. Arnup J.A., speaking for the court, wrote: “In
construing a law that is ‘always speaking’, I am not prepared to be bound
by the construction placed upon an 1874 statute in 1895.” Arnup accepted
that the provision was a remedial one to which s. 10 of the Interpretation
Act applied, entitling it to “such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.”110 The court, however,
refused to articulate a “general rationale” and based its conclusion on the
circumstances of the particular case and on the 1953 amendment in force
at the time.111 This brought to an end litigation over who was covered but,
as we shall see in the next section, the clash between the remedial thrust of
the director liability provision and the judicially entrenched norm of
shareholder and director limited liability was soon to raise its head again,
this time in relation to the question of what was covered.
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IV. THE TRIUMPH OF LIMITED LIABILITY OVER
WAGE PROTECTION ROUND II: DIRECTOR LIABILITY
FOR TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY
The 1850 Province of Canada statute made shareholders liable for “all
debts that may be due and owing …for services performed for such
Company.” Subsequent legislation limited the amount a worker could
claim to either one year’s or six-months’ wages.112 This formulation has
remained essentially unchanged until today, yet the scope of a workers’
entitlement was not the subject of dispute until the 1980s when the
question of director liability for termination and severance pay began to be
litigated.
Why had such claims not surfaced earlier? After all, even in the
nineteenth century, Canadian common law held that contracts of indefinite
hiring were terminable by giving notice and that a worker who was fired
summarily without cause could sue for wrongful dismissal and be awarded
pay in lieu of notice--that is termination pay. As well, workers who were
hired on fixed term contracts could sue if they were terminated without
just cause prior to the end of their contracts.113 Yet prior to the 1980s
there is no reported case of workers suing directors for unpaid termination
pay. The most likely reason for the absence of litigation on this point is
that very few claims were made for wrongful dismissal and nearly all of
them were by managerial and professional employees, exactly the group of
workers held not to be covered by the statute. Moreover, even if an hourly
paid worker had claimed wrongful dismissal it is likely that a court would
have found that the notice to which the worker was entitled was so short as
to make the exercise futile.
112
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A number of developments in the 1970s dramatically changed the social
and legal landscape. As already noted, director liability provisions in
corporation statutes were amended to extend their coverage to all
employees. As well, the growth of the standard employment relationship
following World War II meant that there were more long-term employees
whose greater seniority entitled them to longer notice periods. By the
1970s, however, the long post-war boom began coming to an end,
producing a harsher labour market climate featuring mass lay-offs, factory
closures, and increased precariousness for all workers.114 Business
bankruptcies also increased dramatically from around 3000 annually in
1974 to nearly 11,000 in 1982. Then, following a brief economic
recovery, the number of annual bankruptcies peaked in 1996 at about
15,000.115 Not only did the increase in bankruptcies result in larger
numbers of employees with unpaid wage claims,116 but the harsher
economic climate generally also led to an increase in the amount of
termination and severance pay to which individual workers were entitled
as downsized supervisory and managerial workers who faced an uncertain
labour market claimed longer notice periods and found a sympathetic
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judiciary.117 Moreover, in response to political pressure to address this
development, many governments enacted statutory notice provisions
covering most employees. In Ontario, for example, notice and termination
pay were first introduced into the Employment Standards Act (ESA) in
1970 and in 1974 additional requirements were imposed in the case of
mass terminations. Then in 1981 the legislature also granted terminated
employees in larger firms an entitlement to severance pay.118 As a result
of these changes, the amount of unpaid termination and severance pay was
typically far greater than the amount of unpaid salary and wages when
firms became insolvent, and so their recovery from directors became an
important objective. But these claims also clearly raised the stakes for
directors--who were jointly and severally liable regardless of whether the
company was closely held or publicly traded, or whether they were major
shareholders, active managers, or outside directors--and the question of
their liability for these claims was soon before the courts.119
Before turning to the cases, it will be helpful to identify the three sources
of entitlement to termination and severance pay, since that sometimes
affected the court’s judgment about whether the money owing was a debt
for services rendered to the corporation. First, employment standards laws
in every province now provide minimum notice periods for most
employees or for payment in lieu of notice. In Ontario and the federal
jurisdiction, the legislation also provides for an additional payment, known
as severance pay, to long-term employees who are terminated by large
employers. Second, the terms of an individual contract of employment or
a collective agreement may stipulate the entitlement of employees who are
117
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terminated without just cause, provided that the amount is not less than the
statutory minimum. Third, at common law there is an implied right to
reasonable notice of termination in contracts of indefinite hiring and a
worker who is summarily dismissed without notice or pay in lieu of notice
can sue for wrongful dismissal. There is no separate claim for severance
pay under Canadian common law.120
The first case in which the liability of directors for unpaid termination and
severance pay arose was Mesheau v. Campbell et al., a 1982 decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal. A terminated employee won a common law
wrongful dismissal action against his corporate employer and when he
could not collect on the judgment he sued the directors under the Canada
Business Corporations Act (CBCA). The court denied the claim. A brief
judgment held that damages for wrongful dismissal are not a debt for
services performed for the corporation.121 This approach was followed in
subsequent Ontario cases, involving express contractual obligations as
well as ESA-based claims for termination and severance pay.122 The court
of appeal in Alberta reached a similar conclusion based on its
interpretation of the province’s business corporations act.123 Courts of
appeal in two other jurisdictions, however, viewed the matter differently.
In Saskatchewan, the court held that common law damages for wrongful
dismissal fell within the statutory definition of wages because they are
“compensation for personal services due to the employer.” As wages, they
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are a debt for services performed and, therefore, directors are liable.124 In
Manitoba, the court of appeal upheld a labour board decision that found
directors liable for severance pay owed pursuant to a contractual
agreement.125 Finally, the Québec court of appeal split on the issue. In
Schwartz v. Scott the court held that severance payments due under a
collective agreement formed part of the employees’ remuneration and,
therefore, was a debt due for services rendered, even though it also held
that director liability provisions should be narrowly interpreted because
they derogate from the norm of limited liability.126 Five years later,
another panel of the Quebec court of appeal distinguished Schwartz and
followed Meshau in a civil damages case.127
The question of directors’ liability for unpaid termination and severance
pay reached the Supreme Court of Canada in Barrette v. Crabtree, a case
from Québec, which arose out of a civil action by 29 managerial
employees who had been terminated without notice. They were awarded
$300,000 for wrongful dismissal, which they sought to collect from the
directors of their federally incorporated employer when the company
defaulted. L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote the court’s unanimous judgment
denying the claim on the ground that damages for failure to give adequate
notice is not a debt for services performed for the corporation.128
The judgment exemplifies the juridical triumph of limited liability over the
remedial thrust of labour and employment law and so merits careful
scrutiny. It begins by recognizing that the director liability provision of
the CBCA, s. 114(1), is ambiguous and that different rules of statutory
124
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interpretation could be applied to produce different results.129 L’HeureuxDubé then turns to the statute’s history. She correctly identifies its origin
in the 1848 New York State statute, but misses completely the debates that
preceded its enactment in New York or in pre-confederation Canada.130
Perhaps for this reason, her judgment never considers the view that that
protecting workers’ wages through shareholder liability was a condition of
granting investors the privilege to form limited liability corporations.
Of course, L’Heureux-Dubé recognizes that the purpose of director
liability is to protect employees in the event of a bankruptcy or insolvency
of a corporation and she also accepts that employees are entitled to more
protection than ordinary creditors because of their special vulnerability.131
However, she positions these observations against “the specific legal
framework of s. 114(1). …In terms of the general principles governing
company law, the provision is exceptional… First, the rule departs from
the fundamental principle that a corporation’s legal personality remains
distinct from that of its members. In so doing s. 114(1) C.B.C.A. creates
an exception to the more general principle that no one is responsible for
the debts of another. It is against this background that the present appeal
must be considered.”132
Thus we see the inversion triumphant. L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s interpretation
constitutes as legal bedrock the corporation’s separate legal personality
and the principle of limited liability, which combine to shield shareholders
and managers of corporations from any personal responsibility for its
debts. From there it follows that director liability for workers’ wages is
129
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exceptional and, therefore, to be interpreted narrowly. Against this
interpretive background, L’Heureux-Dubé J. characterizes termination and
severance pay as damages arising from non-performance of a contractual
obligation to give sufficient notice, rejecting the alternative view that
entitlement to termination pay flows from the performance of service to
the corporation.133
Having made a series of interpretive choices, L’Heureux-Dubé J.
concludes the judgment by implausibly denying that the court had any
agency in the matter.
However much sympathy one may feel for the
appellants, who have been deprived of certain
benefits resulting the contract of employment with
their employer, that does not give a court of law the
authority to confer on them rights which Parliament
did not intend them to have…Only Parliament is in a
position, if it so wishes, to extend these benefits after
weighing the consequences of so doing. This, in the
final analysis, remains a political choice and cannot
be the function of the courts.134
But even as the court denies that it is making choices in the interpretation
of an admittedly ambiguous legislative provision, its judgment uses
language that vindicates the alternative view that it rejected, for if these
workers are being “deprived of certain benefits resulting from the contract
of employment” then surely it is also fair to conclude that the amount
owing was a debt for a service provided. The provision of service is, after
all, the consideration that makes enforceable the implied contractual duty
to provide notice of termination or pay in lieu.135
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In this regard, it is interesting to note that in other contexts where courts
have been asked to consider the juridical character of termination and
severance pay, they have concluded that these are wages payable as
compensation for services performed for the employer. For example, prior
to Barrette, courts of appeal in Saskatchewan and British Columbia had
held that termination and severance pay were wages for the purposes of
their employment standards legislation. In both cases, the court based its
determination on the statutory definition of wages, which in neither case
made specific reference to these types of payments.136 In the British
Columbia case, McLachlin J.A. (now the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Canada), unreservedly declared: “Severance pay is a contractual
obligation of the employer incurred in exchange for the employee’s
services or labour. As such, it constitutes compensation payable for those
services or labour.”137
As well, since Barrette the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
juridical nature of termination and severance pay in Wallace v. United
Grain Growers.138 The issue arose in the context of determining whether a
bankrupt could pursue a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal. The
outcome hinged on whether these damages came within a statutory
exception for “salary, wages or other remuneration from a person
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status rather than contract based).
136

Bott v. Mel City Electric Ltd (1988), 64 Sask. R. 218 (C.A.); Citation Industries Ltd.
v. British Columbia (Director of Employment Standards) (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 347
(B.C.C.A.).
137

Citation Industries, 352. Also, see Re Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Zwelling
(1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 592 (ON Div. Ct.), 626, where the court found “with some doubt”
that severance pay, like other fringe benefits, should be regarded as wages under the
ESA. That part of the decision was not challenged in the appeal. See 11 O.R. (2d) 740
(ON C.A.).
138

(1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).

2008]

LIMITED LIABILITY TO EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY

51

employing the bankrupt.”139 Speaking for the majority, Iacobucci J.
accepted that the bankrupt was entitled to sue.
As I see the matter, the underlying nature of the
damages awarded in a wrongful dismissal action is
clearly akin to “wages” referred to in s. 68(1)….
The fact that this sum is awarded as damages at
trial in no way alters the fundamental character of the
money. As an award of damages in a wrongful
dismissal action is in reality the wages that the
employer ought to have paid the employee either over
the course of the period of reasonable notice or as pay
in lieu of notice.140
In a dissenting judgment concurred in by two other judges, McLachlin J.
(as she then was), agreed with Iacobucci J.’s conclusion on this point.141
Not surprisingly in light of this holding, a case was recently brought in
Ontario, Englefield v Wolf,142 seeking to have directors held liable for
unpaid termination and severance pay. Cullity J., however, declined the
invitation to hold that Wallace effectively reversed Barrette. Apart from
the natural reticence that a lower court judge might feel in making such a
determination, Cullity also sought to reconcile the two cases. He accepted
that the protection of workers’ wages was the underlying policy
consideration in both the director liability and the bankruptcy exemption
provisions.
The difference was that under the CBCA “other
considerations become relevant when it is sought to make directors – and
139

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 68(1).

140

Wallace, 24-25.

141

Ibid, 38 (“Damages in lieu of reasonable notice constitute “salary, wages or other
remuneration” for the purposes of bankruptcy legislation and hence are recoverable.”)
142

[2005] O.J. No. 4895 (Sup. Ct.)

52

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 02

not the employer – liable.” Cullity then quoted L’Heureux-Dubé’s view
that director liability was a major exception to the fundamental principles
of company law, demonstrating once again the work that the inversion
continues to perform in limiting wage protection.143

IV. CONCLUSION
In this article I argue that at least until the mid-nineteenth century, the idea
that investors should be able to pool their capital and not be personally
responsible for the obligations of their joint enterprise was not widely
accepted. A particular concern was that the employees of limited liability
corporations would be unprotected in the event the corporation became
insolvent.
Legislatures responded to this sentiment by making
shareholders and then directors personally responsible for workers’ wages
in the event the corporation defaulted. This was a condition of granting
investors the privilege of forming limited liability corporations. Within a
short time, however, the courts inverted this understanding, asserting that
separate corporate personality and the limited liability of shareholders and
directors were basic norms and that wage protection was a special
privilege. This became an important basis for reading narrowly the
personal scope of the director liability provision and underpins the
Supreme Court of Canada’s determination the legislation does not make
directors personally liable for termination and severance pay.
It is not a given, however, that the protective dimensions of labour
and employment law must always give way to the norms of capitalist
legality.
The dilemma is, indeed, a recurring one. Thus, it is always
possible that the Supreme Court of Canada will revisit the issue of director
liability for termination and severance pay and reach a different
conclusion in light of its decision in Wallace. Also, legislatures may
143
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strengthen wage protection rights in response to narrow judicial
interpretations of existing provisions. For example, as we saw earlier,
although it took many years legislation was enacted in the post-World War
II era to overcome the effects of Welch v. Ellis and its progeny and make
directors liable for all employees’ wages, not just those of the most
subordinate. As well, legislation in a few Canadian jurisdictions is
currently interpreted to impose personal liability on directors for
termination and severance pay.144 Finally, the claim there needs to be an
effective mechanism to insure that workers will be paid the wages owed to
them when their corporate employer becomes insolvent remains strong145
and proposals to end director liability for workers wages have not been
successful.146 Indeed, at a time when well-publicized scandals have
undermined the legitimacy of the corporation, the norms of separate legal
personality and limited liability may be less secure than in the recent
past.147
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The imposition of liability on directors may not be the optimal or even a
very effective way of protecting workers’ wages.148 The point of the
chapter, however, is not to defend director liability, but rather to show
historically that when the ground of capitalist legality was in formation it
was shaped in part by popular resistance to some of its features.
Shareholder and director liability for workers’ wages is an example of that
phenomenon. Within a matter of years and with the active assistance of
the judiciary, the soft ground of capitalist legality was solidified into the
bedrock of the legal system, narrowing the spaces that resistance had
created for workers’ rights and insuring that in the future carving workers’
protection out of that bedrock would be hard work.
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